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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4-
103(2)(j)(2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in 
denying plaintiffs' request to specifically question prospective jurors concerning 
HCA as unduly prejudicial, when HCA was not the real party in interest; no 
claims were asserted against HCA; the existence of HCA and its financial 
resources were not relevant to any negligence issues asserted against Timpanogos; 
HCA was not liable for any part of a potential judgment; and plaintiffs were 
allowed to question the prospective jurors in a manner sufficient to ferret out any 
possible bias or prejudice? 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in 
denying plaintiffs' request to introduce evidence concerning HCA in response to 
statements by defense counsel identifying Timpanogos as a community hospital 
when "community hospital" is a recognized term of art in the medical community 
and was relevant to Timpanogos' defense concerning the standard of care? 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when 
it found that the prejudicial effect of questioning witnesses concerning HCA far 
outweighed any probative value that such questions could have? 
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4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when 
it denied plaintiffs5 request to call Dr. Nageotte as a rebuttal witness because his 
testimony was cumulative of two of plaintiffs' experts? 
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when 
it denied plaintiffs' request to call Judith Walker as a rebuttal witness where Nurse 
Harvey's testimony could have been reasonably anticipated, Ms. Walker had not 
been disclosed until the night before she was to be called to testify; and Nurse 
Harvey was extensively cross-examined on the issue which plaintiffs now claim 
Nurse Walker would have addressed? 
6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when 
it denied plaintiffs' request to call Nurse Anderson as a rebuttal witness after 
finding that she was not qualified to do so as she had not practiced labor and 
delivery since 1985, had not studied nursing standards since 1995, and her 
testimony was wholly cumulative of plaintiffs' nurse expert Laurie Mahlmeister? 
7. Whether plaintiffs have shown that any of the trial court's rulings about which 
they complain affected the outcome of the trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As plaintiffs acknowledged (PL Br. at 1-6), each of the trial court's rulings at issue 
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion is established 
"only when [the district court's] decision was against the logic of the circumstances and 
so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice . . . [or] resulted from 
bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 WL 2015436, at *6 (Utah July 
14, 2009)(internal quotations omitted); see also Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 31 P.3d 557, 563 (Utah 2001) (a trial court's "exercise of discretion . . . 
necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if. . . no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the 
trial court.5'). In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, an appellate 
court "will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court unless the action it takes 
is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of [that] discretion." Marchand v. 
Marchand, 147 P.3d 538, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). Even if the appellate court reaches a 
different conclusion, "[it] will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court 
absent an abuse of discretion." Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972 , 973 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Furthermore, "an appellant [has] the burden of showing not only that an error 
occurred, but that it was substantial and prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived in 
some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury. "Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). Conversely, "[i]f the error was harmless, that 
is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
it affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." Armed Forces Ins. 
Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 41 (Utah 2003). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 is determinative of the third, fourth and fifth issues. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 is determinative of the sixth issue. These rules are set out in 
the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from an action alleging medical malpractice against defendants-
appellees Timpanogos Regional Medical Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation, d/b/a 
Timpanogos Regional Hospital and Timpanogos Regional Hospital (herein collectively 
'Timpanogos"), by plaintiffs-appellants Ryan Braithwaite and Mandy Braithwaite, 
individually and as parents and natural guardians of Trevin Braithwaite, a minor, to 
recover for injuries allegedly caused by negligent nursing care during Mrs. Braithwaite's 
labor process prior to Trevin's birth. Plaintiffs also filed suit against Mrs. Braithwaite's 
obstetrician, Robert C. Richards, M.D., but plaintiffs subsequently reached a settlement 
with Dr. Richards and dismissed him from the case prior to trial. 
On June 30, 2008, after a week and a half trial, the jury returned a unanimous 
verdict in favor of Timpanogos and against plaintiffs. (R. 2952). According to the special 
verdict, the jury answered "No" to the question: "Did Timpanogos Regional Hospital, 
acting through its nurses, breach the standard of care applicable to the hospital or its 
nurses?" (R. 2724-27). On August 29, 2008, judgment was entered on the verdict. (R. 
2952). The trial court subsequently denied plaintiffs' Rule 50 motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. (R. 2050). Plaintiffs did not file or orally move for a Rule 59 
motion for a new trial. 
Plaintiffs now appeal from the judgment entered on the special verdict and seek a 
new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Braithwaite's Admission 
In the early morning hours of January 2, 1999, Mandy Braithwaite was admitted to 
Timpanogos Regional Hospital in labor, having been induced the previous day. (R. 3021, 
at 1480). Upon her arrival, she was received by Nurse Virginia "Ginger" Law, who 
checked her into her room, placed her in a gown and put her into bed. (R. 3021, at 1480-
81). 
Fetal Monitor Attached 
At approximately 3:00 a.m., Nurse Law connected a fetal heart monitor to Mandy, 
which is used to determine the frequency of contractions and records the baby's heart 
rate. (R. 3018, at 381; R. 3022, at 1647, 1657, 1682). As the monitor detects the motion 
of the baby's heart and the pattern of the mother's contractions, it creates a fetal monitor 
strip of paper that comes out of the machine. (R. 3018, at 382). The fetal heart monitor 
also transmits the information to the central nursing station for the other members of the 
labor and delivery team to observe and evaluate the fetal heart tracings. (R. 3018, at 475). 
The fetal monitor strip has a top line - which represents the fetal heart rate over time -
and a bottom line - which represents the contraction pattern. (R. 3018, at 382). 
Physicians and nurses caring for a mother and fetus during labor watch the fetal monitor 
strip to observe how the fetus is responding to contractions, confirm the baby is receiving 
oxygen, and otherwise identify when the fetus is doing well, when warning signs arise 
and when there are catastrophic events. (R. 3018, at 381-83). 
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As the physicians and nurses examine the fetal monitor strip, they look for 
accelerations - increases in the baby's heart rate - and decelerations - decreases in the 
baby's heart rate. Some decelerations are perfectly normal, while others can be signs of a 
potential problem. (R. 3018, at 386-387). Some decelerations are caused by umbilical 
cord compression. When that happens, it causes a decrease in blood flow and oxygen 
delivery to the baby and the baby's heart rate slows as a consequence. (R. 3018, at 385). 
These types of decelerations are normal. (R. 3018, at 386). Another type of deceleration 
is due to problems with the placenta. (R. 3018, at 385). Oxygen is transferred from the 
mother's bloodstream into the placenta and then into the baby's umbilical cord. (R. 3018, 
at 385). If the placenta begins to tear away from the uterine wall, it affects the oxygen 
transfer to the baby and causes a deceleration. (R. 3018, at 385-87). These types of 
decelerations are not normal but an indicator of a potential serious problem that must be 
watched closely. (R. 3018, at 386-87). 
Most decelerations last approximately the length of the contraction or about a 
minute to 90 seconds, depending on when they occur in labor. (R. 3018, at 386). When 
the slowing or deceleration lasts longer than the contraction, that over time may become a 
warning sign and problematic that the baby is not receiving sufficient oxygen to meet the 
needs to survive and thrive during labor and delivery. (R. 3018, at 386). However, if the 
baby's heart rate recovers from a deceleration to its preestablished baseline after a nurse 
performs interventions, i.e. change in mother's position, oxygen to the mother, IV of 
additional fluids, and the strip demonstrates variability, that is a reassuring heart rate 
pattern. (R. 3018, at 392). 
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As the fetal monitor records the baby's heart rate over the course of labor, a 
baseline heart rate is established. (R. 3018, at 384). The baseline heart rate may be in the 
70 to 80 or 140 to 150 beats per minute range, but it should be stable. (R. 3018, at 384). 
The normal fetal heart rate is between 110 and 160 beats per minute. (R. 3018, at 446). If 
you trace that pattern out on a piece of paper, it will not be a flat line, but will show 
jitteriness or irregularity, signifying variability, which is a very reassuring sign in an 
unborn baby. (R. 3018, at 384-85). There should be variability in the baby's heart rate 
over time, in response to the contractions, to changes in the mother's position, to things 
that the doctor and nurses are doing, such as vaginal exams. (R. 3018, at 384). 
Variability around the baseline heart rate is important because it tells a physician or a 
nurse that the baby is receiving adequate oxygenation at that point in time to meet its 
metabolic needs and to survive and thrive during the birth process. (R. 3018, at 385). 
When there is variability or accelerations or both, that indicates that irrespective of 
any decelerations the fetus is well oxygenated and considered healthy (R. 3018, at 391; 
3022, at 1710-11), and not suffering from a condition called acidosis. (R. 3020, at 1174). 
Acidosis occurs when the fetus is not receiving adequate oxygenation, and the pH levels 
- the measure of the degree of acidity or neutrality of the blood - in its blood are altered 
and become acidic. (R. 3020, at 1175; R. 3022, at 1668). If acidosis occurs, it can lead to 
injury of the fetus, even death. (R. 3020, at 1175). Whether a fetus is suffering from 
acidosis is determined by reviewing the fetal monitor tracings and ensuring there are 
accelerations and variability. (R. 3020, at 1175). If the fetal monitor demonstrates 
7 
variability or accelerations or both, there is no acidosis and no need for urgent 
intervenion. (R. 3018, at 385, 465; R. 3020, at 1175). 
Mrs. Braithwaite's Labor 
After Nurse Law connected the fetal monitor to Mandy, she then conducted a 
vaginal exam and determined that Mandy's cervix was dilated four to five centimeters, 
showing that she was in active labor. (R. 3022, at 1682-83). At approximately 3:10 a.m., 
the monitor showed that the baby's heart rate was at 120 to 125 beats per minute. (R. 
3022, at 1685). Based on those readings, Trevin's baseline fetal heart rate was 
determined to be 120 beats per minute. (R. 3022, at 1685-6). 
At approximately 3:30 a.m., Mandy had a spontaneous rupture of the membranes 
- her bag of waters broke. (R. 3022, at 1689). At that time, Nurse Law documented that 
the amniotic fluid was blood-tinged but did not contain meconium - fetal bowel 
movement in amniotic fluid thought to be caused by stressful episodes to the baby. (R. 
1186; R. 3022, at 1689). Shortly thereafter, the fetal heart monitor registered an 
acceleration around the same time Mandy had a contraction. (R. 3022, at 1695). Trevin's 
heart rate then returned to baseline. (R. 3022, at 1695). At approximately 3:50 a.m., the 
nurse anesthetist started an epidural for Mandy. (R. 3022, at 1696). At that time, the 
fetal heart monitor registered a deceleration which then came back up to baseline within 
30 seconds. (R. 3022, at 1696). Shortly thereafter, the fetal heart monitor registered 
another acceleration. (R. 3022, at 1699). At 4:08 a.m., the monitor registered a prolonged 
deceleration - a common occurrence for a baby's heart rate after an acceleration. (R. 
3022, at 1699-1700). When a deceleration immediately follows an acceleration, the 
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deceleration is benign - it does not represent stress on the fetus, cord compression, or 
uteroplacental insufficiency. (R. 3022, at 1699-1700). In the hour prior to 4:37, six to 
seven decelerations were noted. (R. 3020, at 1203, 1206, 1225, 1234, 1240-42). 
Dr. Richards Assesses The Condition Of His Patients - Leaves The Hospital 
At approximately 4:37 a.m., Dr. Richards arrived in the room, reviewed Mandy's 
chart and the prior fetal monitor tracings (R. 3018, at 474) and determined that they were 
very reassuring and normal. (R. 3018, at 463, 476). Dr. Richards then placed Mandy in a 
lithotomy position, conducted a vaginal exam and ruptured her forebag of waters. (R. 
3018, at 409; R. 3022, at 1705-06). Dr. Richards was aware of the prior decelerations 
and that Mandy had leaked some blood-tinged amniotic fluid. (R. 3018, at 474). He then 
placed two internal types of monitors, one that measures the fetal heart rate (an internal 
fetal scalp electrode) directly from the baby's scalp and one that measures the contraction 
patterns of the uterus. (R. 3021, 1481-82; R. 3022, at 1645-46, 1706). At this time, the 
fetal heart monitor registered a prolonged deceleration, revealing a fetal heart beat of 60 
to 70 beats per minute. (R. 3022, at 1706, 1724). Dr. Richards completed inserting the 
intrauterine catheter and internal scalp electrode, gave Mandy oxygen, and repositioned 
her on her left side. (R. 3022, at 1707). 
At approximately 4:46 a.m., within a minute or two of her repositioning, Trevin's 
heart rate returned to baseline. (R. 3018, at 420; R. 3022, at 1708-09). Dr. Richards 
believed that this deceleration was attributable to Mandy's change in position. (R. 3022, 
at 1708). He then discussed the patients' conditions with Nurse Law and subsequently 
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left the hospital at approximately 4:50 a.m.. (R. 3018, 463, 469-70; R. 3021, at 1482). 
Up to this point, there was no evidence of the baby being acidotic. (R. 3018, at 460). 
Fetal Monitor Readings Subsequent To Dr. Richards' Departure 
Between 4:55 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., after Dr. Richards left the hospital, the fetal 
heart monitor registered approximately six decelerations. (R. 3018, at 461) similar to 
those that had occurred in the hour prior to Dr. Richards' arrival. (R. 3020, at 1203, 1206, 
1225, 1234, 1240-42; R. 3022, at 1723-24, 1851-52). Each of these decelerations were 
then followed by accelerations and variability, giving the nurses a reassuring pattern. (R. 
3018, at 461-62). At approximately 5:48 a.m., Nurse Law conducted a vaginal exam, 
noting that Mandy's cervix was dilated six centimeters. (R. 3018, at 422). At 
approximately 5:48 to 5:49 a.m., after Nurse Law completed the vaginal exam, the 
monitor registered a prolonged deceleration (R. 3018, at 422; R. 3022, at 1722), just as 
occurred around 4:50 a.m. when Dr. Richards did a vaginal exam (R. 3018, at 409; R. 
3022, at 1705-06). Nurse Law proceeded to stimulate the fetus' scalp to accelerate its 
heart rate. (R. 3018, at 422). At approximately 5:52 a.m., after stimulating its scalp three 
times, the heart rate recovered, (R. 3018, at 422), just as it had for Dr. Richards at 4:46 
a.m. (R. 3018, at 420; R. 3022, at 1708-09). 
Between 5:50 or 5:54 a.m., Nurse Rynda Christensen started her shift and was 
assigned to Mandy Braithwaite. (R. 3019, at 866-67). When she arrived at the nurses 
station, she was told by the charge nurse, Lura Carey, that there was a deceleration at 
approximately 5:50 a.m. (R. 3019, at 871, 892). Nurse Christensen then walked into 
Mandy's room and met with Nurse Law. (R. 3019, at 868). Nurse Law informed her that 
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Mandy had received two doses of induction, that the baby's heart rate had decelerated a 
couple of times but had recovered. (R. 3019, at 867). Nurse Christensen looked at the 
fetal monitor strip and saw that there was a deceleration at 5:49 a.m., but that the heart 
rate had recovered (R. 3019, at 870) and there were good accelerations and good 
variability. (R. 3019, at 869-870). 
Abnormal Deceleration At 6:03 a.m. - Dr. Richards Notified 
At approximately 6:03 a.m., the monitor registered a severe and prolonged 
deceleration and ultimately bradycardia - a very marked slowing of the fetal heart rate 
(R. 3018, at 464, 536) - not attributable to a vaginal exam or other normal cause. Both of 
plaintiffs' liability experts agreed that this represented a severe profound dramatic change 
in the fetus' condition. (R. 3018, at 464, 536). Up until this point, there was every 
indication that the baby was properly oxygenated, healthy and would deliver vaginally. 
(R. 3018, at 462, 465). This deceleration at 6:03 a.m. was manifested by a sudden drop 
in the fetal heart rate down to approximately 60 beats per minute, and was believed to 
have been caused by either a partial placental abruption or cord compression. (R. 3018, at 
410,430,606-608). 
Nurse Christensen determined that this deceleration seemed to last longer than the 
other two she had observed on the strip and she initiated interventions. (R. 3019, at 871). 
She rolled Mandy on to her other side, increased the IV fluid, and performed a scalp 
stimulation on the baby. (R. 3019, at 871). Within a minute or two, Nurse Christensen 
recognized that the interventions were not causing the heart rate to improve and asked 
Nurse Law to go out and notify Dr. Richards. (R. 3018, at 430-31; R. 3019, at 872). At 
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the same time, Nurse Christensen picked up the phone and called the nurses' station and 
requested that they contact Dr. Richards. (R. 3019, at 872-73). At approximately 6:05 
a.m., Dr. Richards was notified. (R. 3018, at 431). 
Dr, Richards Orders Preparations For Crash C-Section 
Marylee Stone, another nurse working that night, informed Nurse Christensen that 
Dr. Richards had been informed and was on his way in to the hospital. (R. 3019, at 875). 
Nurse Stone also informed Nurse Christensen that Dr. Richards had ordered them to start 
an amniofusion - process where fluid is instilled into the womb to bring the baby off of 
the umbilical cord to increase its heart rate (R. 3019, at 875) - and prepare Mandy for a 
crash c-section. (R. 3019, at 894). At that time, Nurse Christensen gave Mandy Bicitra, a 
medication given preoperatively to all patients who are going to have surgery to prevent 
them from vomiting by reducing acid in the stomach. (R. 3018, at 431-32; R. 3019, at 
876). At approximately 6:10 a.m., Mandy was moved to the operating room where she 
arrived at 6:14 a.m. (R. 3018, at 414). 
Dr. Richards Performs C-Section 
Dr. Richards arrived in the operating room at approximately 6:20 a.m., made a 
skin incision at 6:26 a.m. and delivered the baby by 6:28 a.m., 23 minutes after calling 
for a crash c-section. (R. 3019, at 950). At birth, Trevin had an apgar score of zero, 
meaning that he was in a lifeless condition, no respiratory effort and no muscle tone. (R. 
3018, at 447). Once resuscitation efforts were initiated, Trevin's condition began to 
improve and at five minutes, Trevin's apgar score had gone up to three, meaning there 
were signs of life, a heartbeat and some improvement in color. (R. 3018, at 447). 
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Suit Filed 
On or about March 30, 2001, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging medical 
malpractice against Dr. Richards and Timpanogos. (R. 0087-92). As against Dr. 
Richards, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that he failed to properly monitor and treat Mandy 
and Trevin Braithwaite during the labor and delivery process, that he improperly left the 
hospital under circumstances that indicated a need for close monitoring and potential 
emergency intervention, and that he failed to timely present to perform an emergency C-
section before Trevin suffered permanent brain damage. (R. 0029). As against 
Timpanogos, plaintiffs alleged that the Timpanogos nurses breached the standard of care 
by failing to call Dr. Richards at 5:51 a.m. after the deceleration at 5:48-49 a.m.. (R. 
0087-92). Had they called Dr. Richards at that time, plaintiffs claimed Dr. Richards 
would have been able to return to the hospital, prepare for surgery, and deliver Trevin by 
6:13 a.m. without Trevin suffering any neurological injuries. (R. 3018, at 563-64; R. 
3019, at 951-53). 
Dr. Richards' Changed Opinions 
On May 29, 2002, Dr. Richards sat for a deposition in which he gave favorable 
expert testimony concerning the nurses and the care provided to Mandy and Trevin 
Braithwaite. (R. 1173-1203). In particular, Dr. Richards testified that when he left the 
hospital around 4:50 a.m., "the baby was looking fine" and he "felt very comfortable 
leaving if [he] needed to for other reasons." (R. 1202, at 6). Dr. Richards further 
explained that he "was very comfortable that the tracings look fine, everything was going 
well." (R. 1202, at 8). In addition, Dr. Richards testified that he "had a very good nurse 
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on that morning that certainly is my eyes and ears and calls me immediately if there are 
things that require my presence." (R. 1201, at 9-10). Dr. Richards "felt comfortable that 
all of the nursing that was available and helping with the case were very good." (R. 1201, 
at 11). 
Dr. Richards' deposition testimony concerning his interpretations of the fetal heart 
monitor strip was also supportive and consistent with that of defendants' experts (See 
Expert Testimony, infra). With respect to the prolonged deceleration at 4:37 a.m., Dr. 
Richards testified that when placing a mother on her back and inserting fetal scalp 
electrodes through the vagina, it is "not uncommon" that placement of fetal scalp 
electrodes and positional changes will cause a drop in the fetal heart rate. (R. 1186, at 
71). Although the heart rate dropped, "it responded fairly rapidly to positional changes 
and the oxygen." (R. 1186, at 72). Dr. Richards further testified that what was significant 
about the fetal heart tracing before he left the hospital was that it showed the baby was 
getting oxygen, that the heart rate was functioning within acceptable limits and it was 
appropriately responding to the mother's contractions. (R. 1180, at 94-95). After looking 
at her history, Dr. Richards determined she had been laboring well and he was satisfied. 
(R. 1180, at 95-96). Dr. Richards acknowledged that prior to 5:50 a.m., there had been 
three instances where the fetal heart rate dipped below the 80s, but that in each instance, 
"it rapidly returned to normal with the usual things we use such as oxygen and positional 
changes. So very short, very brief." (R. 1185-86, at 72-73). 
With respect to the prolonged deceleration at 5:49 a.m., Dr. Richards testified that 
while there was a prolonged deceleration, he characterized it as "normal" in terms of a 
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fetal heart rate, especially since the deceleration was followed by more accelerations, and 
returned to an "acceptable" tracing. (R. 1177, at 107-08). However, with the 
"precipitous" decline in heart rate at 6:03 a.m., which did not respond to any of the 
interventions, Dr. Richards determined that it was time to proceed with a c-section. (R. 
1176, at 109-10). 
In 2003 and 2006, plaintiffs disclosed its retained experts and noted that Dr 
Richards would provide expert opinions. (R.200-03, 826-28). Significantly, plaintiffs 
never disclosed that Dr. Richards would provide opinions beyond those or different from 
those in his completed deposition, especially opinions critical of Timpanogos and its 
nurses. (R. 820-28). Nor did plaintiffs disclose that they intended to elicit new or 
additional undisclosed opinions from Dr. Richards. (R. 820-28). 
However, on October 16, 2007, Dr. Richards reached a confidential settlement 
with plaintiffs and was dismissed from the case. (R. 2207). On May 23, 2008, Dr. 
Richards agreed to appear for a videotaped trial deposition. In his trial deposition, for the 
first time, Dr. Richards criticized the conduct of the nurses who monitored Mandy and 
Trevin after he had left the hospital. Where he previously testified that the nurses were 
doing all of the appropriate things and that the 5:48/5:49 a.m. deceleration was "normal" 
and "acceptable", (R. 1177, at 107-08), in his second deposition, Dr. Richards testified: 
that this deceleration was "concerning," (R. 3019, at 949); that he now expected the 
nurses to have alerted him at that time (R. 3019, at 949); that had they done so, he would 
have returned to the hospital, (R. 3019, at 949); and that he would have ordered and 
completed an emergency c-section by 6:13 a.m. (R. 3019, at 953). 
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At trial, following the selection of the venire, the trial court denied Timpanogos' 
motion in limine seeking to bar Dr. Richards from offering these changed and previously 
undisclosed opinions. (R. 3017, at 276). Defendants then moved for leave to disclose 
rebuttal testimony to impeach Dr. Richards under Utah Rule of Evidence 603 concerning 
his bias, his background, and qualifications, including the facts that he is ineligible for a 
license to practice medicine, he lost his privileges with Timpanogos Regional Hospital 
and he has a history of self-prescribing drugs/drug abuse. (R. 3017, at 277-80, 285). A 
previous trial judge had barred discussion of Dr. Richards' drug abuse and licensing 
when Dr. Richards was still a defendant as overly prejudicial, but no ruling had yet been 
made concerning the facts that he lost his privileges to practice at Timpanogos and that 
he had a dispute with the hospital after he had settled and was out of the case. (R. 3017, at 
285). Ultimately, the trial court denied defendants' request, finding that it was untimely 
and unduly prejudicial to plaintiffs. (R. 3017, at 290). Thus, Dr. Richards' changed trial 
testimony was presented to the jury in full without Timpanogos being able to present its 
rebuttal evidence to discredit that testimony or show Dr. Richards' bias. 
Two days after the court's ruling, the case proceeded to trial. Plaintiffs called four 
liability experts, Nurse Laura Mahlmeister, an expert in nursing practice and procedure; 
Dr. John Elliott, an OB/GYN; Dr. Stephen Glass, a pediatric neurologist; and Dr. Patrick 
Barnes, a neuroradiologist. (R. 3018, at 322, 327, 329). In addition, plaintiffs also called 
Dr. Paul Randle, an economist, to testify concerning damages issues. 
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Plaintiffs' Liability Experts - Standard of Care 
Nurse Laura Mahlmeister 
Nurse Mahlmeister, plaintiffs' nursing practice and procedure expert, testified that 
during the time period from 3:25 a.m. to 4:50 a.m., when Dr. Richards left the hospital, 
each of the decelerations recorded on the fetal monitor strip were followed with 
accelerations and good variability, (R. 3018, at 459) and did not require further 
intervention than the care already provided by the nurses and Dr. Richards. (R. 3018, at 
460; R. 3020, at 1239). Nurse Mahlmeister conceded that when there are accelerations 
and variability in the heart rate tracings, those tracings establish a reassuring pattern for 
the nurses monitoring the baby's condition. (R. 3018, at 461). In fact, until the sudden 
dramatic change in condition that occurred at 6:03 a.m., Nurse Mahlmeister believed 
there was no indication of acidosis or brain injury (R. 3018, at 462) and there was every 
reason to expect that this baby would deliver vaginally and be healthy. (R. 3018, at 465). 
Nurse Mahlmeister further testified that before the change in condition at 6:03 a.m., there 
was no reason for the nurses to advocate a cesarean section. (R. 3018, at 465). 
Yet despite these concessions, Nurse Mahlmeister still opined that the nurses 
should have called Dr. Richards after every deceleration that occurred after 4:50 a.m., (R. 
3018, at 451) regardless of whether they were followed by accelerations and variability 
establishing a reassuring pattern, (R. 3018, at 423). 
Dr. Stephen Glass 
Dr. Glass, plaintiffs' pediatric neurologist expert, opined that while there were 
decelerations during the period from 4:51 a.m. through 6:03 a.m., there were signs of 
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good recovery and no acidosis. (R. 3018, at 600-01). He opined that the deprivation of 
oxygen did not begin until 6:03 a..m. (R. 3018, at 536). Indeed, up until 6:03 a.m., Dr. 
Glass opined that "by all measures'' Trevin "was a normal fetus" and there were no 
indications at that time that Trevin had any sort of brain injury. (R. 3018, at 536-37, 600-
01). Dr. Glass further opined that until 6:03 a.m., there were no indications of any 
abnormality in the pregnancy or in the baby. (R. 3018, at 543). 
Dr. John Elliott 
While Dr. Elliott, plaintiffs' OB/GYN expert, opined that Dr. Richards should 
have been called at each deceleration after he left the hospital at 4:50 a.m., (R. 3020, at 
1207-08), he agreed that the nurses properly provided interventions when there were 
decelerations and each time, up to 6:03 a.m., the baby responded with either variability or 
accelerations, and recovered. (R. 3020, at 1239). Dr. Elliott further agreed that when 
there is evidence of accelerations and/or variability, it confirms that the baby was not 
acidotic(R. 3020, at 1233). 
Dr. Elliott also conceded that when you compare the deceleration at approximately 
4:38 a.m., which Dr. Richards determined was normal (R. 3020, at 1241), to the one at 
5:49 a.m., which plaintiffs claim was the last event that should have prompted the nurses 
to call Dr. Richards, they were reasonably similar. (R. 3020, at 1241). In fact, both 
decelerations occurred at a time when the nurses were performing vaginal exams and 
repositioning Mandy, (R. 3022, at 1723), two recognized causes of decelerations. (R. 
1186; R. 3018, at 478). 
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Dr. Elliott further opined that there was no reasonable basis to believe that the 
decelerations that occurred prior to Dr. Richards departure would suddenly stop. (R. 
3020, at 1240). Rather, a reasonable obstetrician would expect those decelerations and 
those patterns (accelerations and variability) to continue. (R. 3020, at 1240). Dr. Elliott 
believed that Dr. Richards breached the standard of care by leaving the hospital at 4:50 
a.m. (R. 3020, at 1237). However, Dr. Elliott agreed that in the hour after Dr. Richards 
left before the sudden dramatic change in condition at 6:03 a.m., there was close to the 
same number of decelerations (six to seven) that had occurred the hour prior to him 
leaving, which Dr. Richards had been fully aware of and felt was normal. (R. 3020, at 
1203, 1206, 1225, 1234, 1240-42). 
As a small community hospital, Dr. Elliott agreed that the standard of care did not 
require Timpanogos to have 24-hour obstetrical coverage. (R. 3020, at 1251). Rather, Dr. 
Elliott explained, that under ACOG, to comply with the standard of care, a hospital that 
provides obstetrical services must only be able to assemble the appropriate response team 
within 30-minutes of the physician's decision to perform a c-section surgery. (R. 3020, at 
1228). From the time Dr. Richards decided they needed to proceed with a c-section 
(6:05a.m.)(R. 3020, at 1250), they needed to deliver the baby by 6:35 a.m. to comply 
with the standard of care, which they did. (R.3020, at 1228, 1251). 
Defense Experts - Standard of Care 
Three experts testified for the defense. Nurse Carol Harvey, a clinical nurse 
specialist, Dr. John Yeast, an OB/GYN, and Dr. Richard Molteni, a neonatologist. (R. 
3018, at 373; R. 3022, at 1853-54; R. 3023, at 1913). 
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Timpanogos' experts testified that up until 6:03 a.m., there was nothing on 
Trevin's fetal monitor strip that should have alerted the nurses or Dr. Richards that 
Trevin was having problems handling labor. (R. 3023, at 1924-25). As of 4:50 a.m. when 
Dr. Richards left the hospital, defendants' experts testified that the fetal monitor strip 
demonstrated normal variability and that the baby was appropriately oxygenated - not 
acidotic. (R. 3022, at 1711; R. 3023, at 1924-25, 1951). 
With respect to the 5:48/5:49 a.m. deceleration that went down as low at 70 beats 
per minute at one point, it hovered around 90 beats per minute, and there was reassuring 
variability afterwards. (R. 3022, at 1726-27). Like the similar prolonged deceleration that 
occurred at 4:37 a.m., this deceleration too occurred at a time when the patient was 
undergoing a vaginal exam where she was placed on her back, causing her cardiac output 
to change because the fetus compresses her vena cava - the big vein that empties the legs 
and the lower abdominal organs. (R. 3022, at 1725). However, unlike the prolonged 
deceleration at 4:37 a.m., the 5:48/5:49 a.m. deceleration did not drop as far and it 
recovered faster to the baseline. (R. 3022, at 1726). Because there was variability going 
into it and there was variability afterwards, there was reassurance that the baby remained 
oxygenated and had not changed to any type of abnormal metabolism and/or become 
acidotic. (R. 3022, at 1728). Like the 4:37 a.m. prolonged deceleration, the 5:49 a.m. 
deceleration too was not predictive of an impending obstetrical crisis or placental 
abruption, nor was it a significant change in the patient's condition that would require a 
nurse to summon a physician back to the hospital. (R. 3022, at 1728-29). It was only the 
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deceleration at 6:03 a.m. which all experts agreed was a significant change which 
required immediate intervention. 
Causation Evidence 
There was an abundance of evidence that Trevin's cerebral palsy was not related 
to any deprivation of oxygen prior to his birth. In fact, all the causation experts agreed 
that Trevin's birth condition did not meet all of the criteria recognized in the literature for 
establishing such a causal connection. (R. 3018, at 630; R. 3020 at 1259-61; R. 3022, at 
1877; R. 3023, at 1943-44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' primary argument centers around the trial court's decision to exclude 
the prejudicial and irrelevant "background" evidence that Timpanogos was a subsidiary 
of a large corporation (HCA) that had significant financial resources. 
The trial court's denial of plaintiffs' voir dire request to specifically question each 
juror concerning any potential connections with HCA was not an abuse of discretion, 
much less reversible error, because (1) HCA was not a probable real party in interest, (2) 
no claims were asserted against HCA, (3) HCA was not relevant to any negligence issues 
asserted against Timpanogos, and (4) HCA was not liable for any part of a potential 
judgment. Furthermore, plaintiffs had the right to ask any preliminary and general 
questions necessary to elicit potential biases or prejudices that might have permitted more 
specific questioning, but no such potential bias or prejudice was ever shown. 
The trial court appropriately denied plaintiffs' motion in limine to present 
evidence concerning Timpanogos' connection with HCA, or in the alternative, bar 
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defendant from referring to itself as "a community hospital," because (1) "community 
hospital" is a recognized term of art in the medical community denoting both the size and 
services a hospital provides; (2) the probative value of the classification of Timpanogos 
as a "community hospital" as it relates to the issue of standard of care outweighed any 
misconception about the meaning of the term, and (3) any misconception concerning the 
meaning of the term of art "community hospital" was cured by Timpanogos' expert Dr. 
Yeast's subsequent explanation during trial that the term was not meant to carry any 
connotation that the hospital was owned by a municipality or county. 
Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, much less commit reversible 
error, when it found that on balance the potential prejudicial effect of questioning two of 
Timpanogos' former employees (Rynda Christensen and Virginia Law) and expert 
witness (Carol Harvey, R.N.) concerning any association with HCA far outweighed any 
probative value that such questions might have. 
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse it discretion, much less commit reversible 
error, when it denied plaintiffs' request to call certain rebuttal witnesses, just as it had 
prohibited Timpanogos from calling rebuttal witnesses to discredit Dr. Richards' changed 
testimony. 
The trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs' request to call Dr. Nageotte as a 
rebuttal witness because his testimony was wholly cumulative of plaintiffs' other experts, 
Nurse Mahlmeister and Dr. Elliott, and because plaintiffs could have called him in their 
case in chief. 
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Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, much less commit reversible 
error, when it denied plaintiffs' request to call Judith Walker as a rebuttal witness 
because Nurse Harvey's testimony was reasonably anticipated and Ms. Walker had not 
been disclosed until the night before she was to be called to testify. Furthermore, the 
exclusion of her testimony was harmless because plaintiffs extensively cross-examined 
Nurse Harvey on the issue which they now claim Nurse Walker would have addressed. 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion, much less commit reversible error, 
when it denied plaintiffs' request to call Nurse Anderson as a rebuttal witness because 
she was not qualified to render standard of care opinions as she had not practiced labor 
and delivery since 1985, and had not studied nursing standards since 1995, and her 
testimony was wholly cumulative of plaintiffs' nurse expert Laurie Mahlmeister. 
Finally, while none of the trial court's rulings about which plaintiffs complain, 
considered individually or cumulatively, constituted an abuse of the trial court's broad 
discretion, none of them could conceivably rise to the level of reversible error given that 
there was no showing that any of these rulings affected the outcome of the trial. Contrary 
to plaintiffs' assertions, the jury returned the special verdict that it did, not simply 
because the defense witnesses were "bulletproof (PI. Br. 15), but because the testimony 
of plaintiffs' own experts, asserting a standard of care violation by the Timpanogos 
nurses, was inherently inconsistent and contradictory given their agreement that Mrs. 
Braithwaite's decelerations up to 6:03 a.m. were reasurring and consistent with the prior 
pattern of decelerations throughout her entire course of labor and that the 6:03 a.m. event 
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signified a catastrophic change in the patients' condition. See Testimony excerpted in 
Point III, infra. 
ARGUMENT 
I. None Of The Trial Court's Rulings Constituted An Abuse Of Discretion, 
Much Less Reversible Error. 
Many of plaintiffs' asserted trial "errors" pertain to various unsuccessful attempts by 
plaintiffs to advise the jury of the irrelevant relationship between Timpanogos and HCA, 
which plaintiffs assert is the "parent" of Timpanogos, (PL Br. 14), to show "background 
information" (R. 3026, at 27-28) and HCA's large "financial resources" (R. 2547). As 
set forth below, each of these prejudicial attempts was correctly rejected by the trial court 
given the undisputed facts that: 
1) Ti mpanogos is a separate legal entity registered with the Utah Department of 
Corporations and insured by Health Care Indemnity (R. 12-30); 
2) HCA is a separate Delaware corporation with its principal place of business 
in Tennessee (R. 1041, 1043); 
3) HCA is n ot a named party or a real party in interest in this case; 
4) Plaintiffs asserted no claims against HCA; and 
5) HCA is not legally responsible for any judgment entered against 
Timpanogos.1 
1
 Despite the trial court's ruling, the plaintiff still managed to elicit testimony through Dr. 
Richards' trial deposition that Timpanogos is a HCA hospital in violation of the order in 
limine. (R. 3019, at 912; R. 2803). 
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Plaintiffs made no claim of alter ego, and asserted no other basis that would permit the 
separateness of the two corporations to be ignored. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1998). Utah Model Civil Jury Instruction 
2.8, states that a corporate defendant must be considered as an individual, and it is a 
sound principle of Utah law "that corporate veils exists . . . for the very purpose of 
isolating liabilities among separate entities." See Cascade Energy and Metals Corp. v. 
Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1576 (Utah 1990). 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion, Much Less Commit 
Reversible Error, In Precluding Plaintiffs From Questioning Jurors 
Concerning HCA. 
The initial argument in Plaintiffs' brief- complaining of the trial court's denial of 
their request to question jurors concerning potential bias towards HCA - cannot seriously 
be urged as error, much less reversible error. While the scope of voir dire should be 
sufficiently broad to allow the parties to discover potential biases and intelligently 
exercise their for-cause and peremptory challenges, Hornsby v. Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 933 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court has "considerable discretion to 'contain voir dire within 
reasonable limits.'" Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (internal quotations omitted). Whether that discretion has been abused depends on 
whether, "considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an 
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." Evans v. 
Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). 
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On appeal, plaintiffs argue that it was reversible error for the court to deny them 
the opportunity to question jurors during voir dire about contacts or experiences with 
HCA or other HCA facilities because it prevented plaintiffs from discovering potential 
bias and intelligently using their for-cause and peremptory challenges. (PL Br. 17-19). 
Plaintiffs' claim of prejudice is unfounded for many reasons. 
First, while voir dire may explore whether prospective jurors have a relationship 
with a named party, Horsby v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), here, as set forth above, HCA is not a named defendant, plaintiffs have not 
asserted any claims against HCA, HCA is not a probable real party in interest, and HCA 
is not legally responsible for any judgment entered against Timpanogos. (R. 1229-30). 
Secondly, even where a non-party to the suit is a real party in interest, such as a 
defendant's liability insurance carrier, a plaintiff is still not allowed to directly question 
potential jurors about their possible involvement with such an insurer. In Saltas v. Affleck 
105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940), the Utah Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff 
after finding that the trial court had committed reversible error in permitting the plaintiff 
to question prospective jurors about their connections with a defendant's specifically 
named insurance company. The court found reversible error because "the purpose of his 
questions was, patently, to inform the jury that the loss would fall upon an insurance 
company instead of the [named defendant]." Id. at 179, citing Alexiou v. Nockas, 17 P.2d 
911, 914 (Wash. 1933). The court further stated that: 
We are of the opinion that it was reversible error for counsel to interrogate 
each juror as to whether he were a stockholder in a specifically named 
insurance company or generally so as to indicate that an insurance company 
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was the probable real party in interest, a matter foreign to the issues in the 
case, when no preliminary questions had been asked. 
Saltas, 105P.2dl76, 179. 
Thirdly, as mentioned in Saltas and as held in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), plaintiffs had the right to ask non-specific, preliminary or threshold 
questions that could have ferreted out potential biases or prejudices and determined 
whether more specific questions would be appropriate, without any mention of HCA. 
Here, during arguments on defendants' motion in limine, defense counsel suggested this 
measured approach to the issue, proposing several preliminary questions. Specifically, 
defense counsel stated that "there's no reason plaintiff can't ask them . . . Have you been 
at any other hospital in Utah? Do you have any experiences at those hospitals that are 
associated with this case? Do you have any experience with any other hospital 
corporations generally?" (R. 3017, at 36). 
Thereafter, plaintiffs did not ask all of these questions that could have been asked, 
but did engage in questioning of some jurors without evoking any response that showed 
any bias or prejudice, much less that justified any specific questions about HCA. For 
example, during the questioning of Juror No. 4, Bruce Schriener, an ultimate member of 
the panel, Mr. Schriener was asked to discuss any of his experiences with other hospitals 
and whether those experiences may make a difference in his consideration of the case -
to which he responded "I can't see how." (R. 3017, at 70). In addition to the juror 
questionnaire, other prospective jurors were questioned concerning their feelings about 
insurance companies and lawsuits and whether those feelings would prevent them from 
27 
judging the case fairly, (R. 3017, at 134), concerning connections with insurance 
companies, (R. 3017, at 135), concerning experiences they had with other hospitals or 
healthcare providers, (R. 3017, at 154), and concerning any specific biases or prejudices 
towards or against Timpanogos, (R. 3017, at 238-240). None of the impaneled jurors 
ever indicated that they could not render a fair and impartial verdict. (R. 3017, at 42-248) 
Considering the totality of the questioning, plus those questions that plaintiffs' 
counsel could have asked, it is clear that the trial court's rulings on voir dire were 
substantively responsive to plaintiffs' concerns and that plaintiffs had ample opportunity 
to question all the prospective jurors in a manner sufficient to reveal any biases or 
prejudices towards Timpanogos, other hospitals, healthcare providers and healthcare 
corporations, including HCA. See Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah 
Ct App. 1989) (in their totality, and in context with the remainder of voir dire, general 
questions concerning the possibility of returning a multimillion dollar verdict and 
whether the jurors could return a fair and true verdict based on the evidence, were 
sufficient to reveal bias concerning issue of tort reform); see also King v. Fereday, 739 
P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1987) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to ask 
certain questions during voir dire designed to indicate juror bias against personal injury 
suits and to determine connection which jurors might have with defendant's insurance 
carrier where court did inquire generally into jurors' ownership interests in insurance 
businesses). 
Given all of the above, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
precluding plaintiffs from asking prospective jurors specific questions about HCA, and 
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that precluding such questions did not deprive plaintiffs of their ability to conduct a 
meaningful voir dire, exercise their for-cause and peremptory challenges and otherwise 
obtain a fair and impartial jury. As the trial court itself explained: 
I think it is not necessary and I think that you're absolutely correct, it 
injects an insurance element, a potential problem into the panel of jurors 
that may be seated. I see no reason why it should be allowed to determine 
any biases not really connected with anything other than the size of this 
corporation. 
And the inference of insurance, I tried to narrow my ruling last week to 
keep that out. And I think even though you're correct in what you say in 
terms of the broader question of insurance, I think in this particular set of 
facts and circumstances, it would be improper to go any further in this area. 
(R. 3017, at 39-40) (emphasis added). 
Indeed, the prejudice to Timpanogos here would have been far greater than in the 
insurance context where the insurer is at least a real party in interest obligated to pay any 
judgment against its insured. Here, HCA was not a real party in interest, yet any specific 
mention of HCA would have given the jurors exactly the opposite and erroneous 
impression. There was no abuse of discretion, and no reversible error, in precluding 
plaintiffs from examining prospective jurors about HCA. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion, Much Less Commit 
Reversible Error, In Denying Plaintiffs' Request To Introduce 
Evidence Concerning HCA In Response To Defendants' Statements 
Identifying Timpanogos As A "Community Hospital," 
Plaintiffs' entire premise for this point is that Timpanogos was allowed to 
"mischaracterize" itself as "a community hospital", "a small community hospital" or 
"your community hospital." (PL Br. at 14, 19, 20-21). As the trial court correctly 
determined, this premise was wrong for at least four reasons: (1) "community hospital" is 
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a recognized term of art in the medical community denoting both the size and services a 
hospital provides; (2) the classification of Timpanogos as a "community hospital" was 
relevant to the standard of care issue; (3) any misconception concerning the meaning of 
the term of art "community hospital" was cured by Timpanogos' expert Dr. Yeast's 
subsequent explanation during trial; and (4) the trial court struck the terms "small" and 
"your" once an objection to these terms was raised. (R. 3021, at 1560, 1562, 1565; R. 
3022, at 1608). 
During trial, plaintiffs themselves submitted evidence from the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospital Organizations ("JCAHO"), the American Hospital 
Association, and the Department of Health and Human Services (R. 3022, at 1585) 
showing that the Department of Health and Human Services classifies hospitals as 
"quote, sole community hospitals, unquote, or, quote, essential access community 
hospitals, unquote." (R. 3022, at 1587), and that the American Hospital Association 
defines community hospital as all "non-federal, short-term general, and other special 
hospitals", but excludes "prison hospitals or college infirmaries." (R. 3022, at 1587). 
The court was also informed that the term "community hospital" denotes the types of 
facilities and capabilities of those institutions. (R. 3022, at 1590). Furthermore, 
plaintiffs' own expert Dr. Elliott explained that, as a community hospital, the standard of 
care did not require Timpanogos to have 24-hour obstetrical coverage. (R. 3020, at 1251). 
Instead, Dr. Elliott explained, under ACOG, to comply with the standard of care, a 
community hospital that provides obstetrical services must only be able to assemble the 
appropriate response team within 30 minutes of the physician's decision to perform a c-
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section surgery. (R. 3020, at 1228). Thus, Timpanogos urged that it complied with the 
standard of care because from the time Dr. Richards decided to proceed with a c-section 
(6:05 a.m.)(R. 3020, at 1250), Trevin was delivered by 6:28 a.m., seven minutes sooner 
than the standard required. (R. 3020, at 1228, 1251). Based on all of the above, the trial 
court concluded that the term "community hospital" was a term of art that was relevant to 
Timpanogos' defense: 
I asked last night if there was any, anything you could provide to me to 
refer in the, in the classification and accreditation of hospitals that referred 
to community hospital, and appears that there is, it appears that's a standard 
term, a term of art that's used . . . All right. So it's there. You're stuck 
with the term. You can defuse it any way that you feel you can . . . I'll give 
you the latitude you need to cross-examine and explain and identify, but it's 
a term of art, it's a term of art, just like Timpanogos Regional Medical 
Center is term of art. And it's a name. It's used by experts. It's used by 
nurses. It has, it has relevancy in the case as it relates to the physicians' 
requirements to be on call. 
(R. 3022, at 1607-1608). The court further explained its reasoning, stating: 
I do understand that it has somewhat of a prejudicial connotation that it's 
owned by the public and it's their community hospital. I fully understand 
that. But I also understand, as I weigh and balance this, that there's a 
legitimate defense argument as it relates to possible inference by the jury 
that there should have been a surgeon there on call 24 hours a day. And so 
it seems to me to be probative to, for the defense to say that, that is not the 
case in this type of hospital, based on its classification as a community 
hospital. Probative value seems to outweigh its prejudicial effect, if I gave 
you broad latitude in cross-examination of these witnesses to explain and 
identify what a community hospital really stands for and what it doesn't 
stand for. 
(R. 3022, at 1603). 
The trial court's reasoning is unassailable, and in no event an abuse of discretion. 
The evidence established that the term "community hospital" is a recognized term of art 
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within the medical community and its meaning has significant relevance to part of 
Timpanogos' defense. Furthermore, as the court suggested, plaintiffs were welcome to 
cross-examine witnesses to explain and identify what a community hospital really stands 
for, if they sought to challenge Timpanogos9 argument. Moreover, any possible 
"misconception" was ultimately remedied both by the court's striking of the terms "your" 
and "small" (R. 3021, at 1560, 1562, 1565; R. 3022, at 1608) and by the testimony of Dr. 
Yeast, Timpanogos' expert, wherein the following exchange occurred: 
Q: Is St. Luke's where you do your work a tertiary care center? 
A: It is. 
Q: Is that different in some way than a community hospital? 
A: I would say so, yes. 
Q: In what respect? 
A: A community hospital is a facility that provides general 
medical care, general obstetrical care, general surgical care. 
It does not have a teaching role or a research role or a large 
referral base. A tertiary hospital - that term [sic] tertiary is 
usually used for centers that have a number of subspecialists 
in areas so that patients are referred in for care that might be 
unique in the region or unique in the community. 
Q: Okay. And a community hospital doesn't have any indication 
about whether its owned by a municipality or a county or 
anything like that. Is that true? 
A: Not in the way we discuss it, no. 
(R. 3023, at 1948-49) (emphasis added). 
By this testimony, any conceivable "prejudicial connotation" was eliminated. 
Thus, plaintiffs' position reduces itself to an assertion that relevant evidence concerning 
Timpanogos' status as a community hospital, as it pertained to the standard of care in this 
case, entitled plaintiffs to introduce irrelevant evidence concerning HCA that had no 
connection to the standard of care or any other issue in the case, and would instead have 
32 
created the false impression that HCA was a real party in interest and/or that it was liable 
for any judgment that might be entered against Timpanogos. Clearly, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in rejecting this illogical assertion. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Precluding Questioning Of Witnesses 
Concerning HCA. 
The trial court did not commit reversible error in precluding plaintiffs from 
questioning Nurse Law, Nurse Christensen and Nurse Harvey, concerning their alleged 
connections with HCA, because as the trial court ruled, the probative value of such 
questions was outweighed by the probable prejudicial effect that such questions would 
have in confusing the issues and misleading the jury into believing that HCA was a real 
party in interest and liable for any judgment that might be entered against Timpanogos. 
While a cross-examiner is to be given wide latitude in exposing a witness' 
potential bias, this wide latitude is limited by Utah Rule of Evidence 403 which permits 
exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury " State v. Hobbs, 64 P.3d 1218, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Utah R. Evid. 403. 
Here, the trial court, acting well within its broad discretion, appropriately balanced these 
competing interests and concluded that the potential for unfair prejudice to defendants 
outweighed any probative value such questioning could have. (R. 3021, at 1554). 
With respect to Nurse Law and Nurse Christensen, it is axiomatic that these nurses 
would be biased in defending their care. See Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 790 P.2d 
595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Moreover, as plaintiffs' brief acknowledges (PL Br. at 
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21), these witnesses were fact witnesses and the critical facts to which they testified were 
not in dispute. In fact, it was undisputed that Nurse Law had no memory of the events in 
question, (R. 3019, at 832-35) due to a medical procedure that resulted in her loss of 
memory, and thus could not offer anything in addition to what was already in the chart. 
(R. 3019, at 836-37, 839). Thus, the facts that her testimony established were the facts on 
which plaintiffs relied, i.e., that based on the chart she did not ask Dr. Richards to stay 
and that Dr. Richards was not called and asked to return to the hospital until 6:05 a.m. (R. 
3019, at 840-841, 842). 
Likewise, Nurse Christensen was presented as a fact witness to establish the 
undisputed fact on which plaintiffs relied that there was no attempt to call Dr. Richards 
until after the abnormal deceleration at 6:03 a.m. (R. 3019, at 871-874). Moreover, 
contrary to the order in limine, plaintiffs did elicit testimony that Nurse Christensen went 
to work for HCA customer support after she left Timpanogos. (R. 3019, at 860). 
With respect to Nurse Harvey, plaintiffs continue to ignore the legal truism that 
HCA and Timpanogos are wholly separate entities. Plaintiffs unabashedly argue that 
Nurse Harvey has previously worked for HCA in cases involving other HCA hospitals. 
(PI. Br. at 23). Plaintiffs even go as far as to say that Nurse Harvey counts HCA as "one 
of her clients." (PI. Br. at 23). In support of these assertions, plaintiffs cite to portions of 
a deposition Nurse Harvey gave in another case. In that deposition, Nurse Harvey 
unequivocally states that "I have never worked for [HCA], but I've worked for individual 
hospitals" who "at the time had been owned by HCA." (R. 2529). Thus, the truth of the 
matter is that Nurse Harvey does not count HCA as one of her clients. (R. 2529). 
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Furthermore, Nurse Harvey testified that she is "rarely told who owns these hospitals" for 
whom she has testified. (R. 2529). 
Aside from plaintiffs' misstatements, the jury here, unlike in plaintiffs' cited case, 
Board of Education of South Sanpete School District v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 
1980), was well aware that Nurse Harvey was Timpanogos' paid witness (R. 3022, at 
1769), who by virtue of that relationship alone, would be inherently "biased." Likewise, 
the jury was told that in most of the prior cases in which Nurse Harvey has been engaged 
as an expert, she has testified on behalf of the hospital defendant and defended the 
nursing care involved. (R. 3022, at 1633-36). Plaintiffs' argument that they were deprived 
a fair trial because they could not show an additional reason why Nurse Harvey was 
biased, i.e. that HCA was her client, was factually not true and again would have served 
only to falsely imply that HCA was a real party in interest and encouraged the jury to 
decide the case on something other than its merits. 
Apparently attempting to create an impression of unequal treatment, plaintiffs 
raise the fact that prior to trial Timpanogos sought to obtain records from plaintiffs' 
economist expert, Dr. Randle, concerning his relationship with plaintiffs' firm, Dewsup, 
King & Olsen, including records detailing the amount of money Dr. Randle has been paid 
by them for any and all services he provided since January 1999. (PL Br. at 25)(R. 0875-
76). Plaintiffs argue that the trial court allowed Timpanogos "full opportunity to explore 
Dr. Randle's alleged bias arising from his relationship with" Dewsup, King & Olsen, but 
denied plaintiffs the same opportunity to examine Timpanogos' witnesses concerning 
their purported connections with HCA. (PL Br. at 25-26). What plaintiffs fail to point out 
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is that the trial court ultimately quashed Timpanogos' subpoena and prevented them from 
exploring the full extent of Dr. Randle's relationship with plaintiffs' firm and the extent 
of his financial motivation to testify favorably. (R. 3015, at 8-10). While Timpanogos 
could generally examine Dr. Randle concerning the number of cases he is working on for 
plaintiffs' firm, they were deprived of access to the financial evidence that would show 
what Dr. Randle had to lose in the future should he give unfavorable testimony in this 
case. 
In the hearing on plaintiffs' motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum seeking the 
records establishing Dr. Randle's extensive relationship with plaintiffs' firm, plaintiffs' 
counsel tenaciously argued: 
If there is a claim of bias that they could fairly determine it from the 
number of cases in which he's testified, the amount of work he's done for 
our firm, the percent of cases he does for plaintiff versus defendant, a, 
various other questions that they might ask at deposition to ferret out or to 
a, more fully explore the issue if there is a bias. They have adequate 
information. 
(R. 3015, at 4). 
Likewise, plaintiffs had access to "adequate information" concerning Nurse 
Harvey's prior expert work history, what she was paid an hour, what percentage of cases 
she does for plaintiff versus defendant and how many cases she worked on for 
defendants' firm or for Timpanogos and other hospitals. Again, the trial court committed 
no error, much less reversible error, with respect to Nurse Harvey, Nurse Law or Nurse 
Christensen. 
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D. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Denying Plaintiffs' Request To Call 
Rebuttal Witnesses Because Their Testimony Was Either Cumulative, 
Incompetent, Or Was Not Properly Disclosed. 
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion, Much Less 
Commit Reversible Error, In Precluding Plaintiffs From 
Calling Dr. Nageotte As A Rebuttal Witness Because His 
Opinions Would Have Been Cumulative Of Nurse Mahlmeister 
and Dr. Elliott and Plaintiffs Could Have Called Him In Their 
Case In Chief. 
In their brief, plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed reversible error when it 
denied their request to read portions of Dr. Nageotte's deposition to rebut testimony by 
Nurse Harvey, Timpanogos' nursing expert, that it was okay for the nurses not to have 
called Dr. Richards at 5:50 a.m.. (PL Br. at 36-38). Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Nageotte 
would have testified that "Dr. Richards should have been called at 5:50 a.m. because the 
fetal heart monitoring strip indicated a problem with the baby at that time, and, if Dr. 
Richards had been called then, he could have responded appropriately." (PI. Br. at 37). 
This proposed testimony was cumulative, if not identical, to that of both Nurse 
Mahlmeister and Dr. Elliott, and therefore, was properly excluded. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides that "[although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." U.R.E. 403 
(emphasis added). Rebuttal evidence is evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, or 
otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence. Board of Education 
of South Sanpete School District v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1980). However, 
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"rebuttal evidence is limited to evidence made necessary by the adverse party's reply/' 
i.e., "to meet the new facts put in by the opponent in his case in reply." Adams v. Lang, 
275 P.2d 881, 882-83 (Utah 1954)(no abuse of discretion is denying rebuttal witness 
when witness could have been called in plaintiffs case in chief). 
In plaintiffs' case in chief, Nurse Mahlmeister repeatedly testified that the nurses 
should have called Dr. Richards at 5:50 a.m. because the fetal monitoring strip was 
indicating prolonged decelerations. (R. 3018, at 428, 449, 451, 453). Later, in plaintiffs 
case in chief, Dr. John Elliott, an obstetrician/gynecologist like Dr. Nageotte, also 
testified that the nurses should have called Dr. Richards at 5:49/5:50 a.m. due to the 
prolonged decelerations indicated on the fetal heart monitor strip. (R. 3020, at 1207-08). 
Thus, for the testimony for which he was being offered, plaintiffs had already elicited the 
very same opinion, on multiple occasions. Nothing about Dr. Nageotte's testimony 
would have refuted, modified, explained, or otherwise minimized or nullified the effect 
Ms. Harvey's testimony in a way that had not already been previously done by Nurse 
Mahlmeister or Dr. Elliott. See Adams v. Lang, 275 P.2d 881, 882 (Utah 1954)(no abuse 
of discretion is denying rebuttal witness when witness could have been called in 
plaintiffs case in chief and the opposing party had not offered any new facts in their case 
in reply). 
Plaintiffs' cited cases Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) and Astill v. 
Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Utah Ct App. 1998), are not to the contrary. In Randle and Astill 
both involving car accidents, the reviewing courts ordered new trials because the 
defendants raised new facts and evidence (i.e. the speed of the vehicles, impact angles 
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and the design and strength of both cars' bumpers) in support of their defenses, which 
had not been raised or addressed in the plaintiffs case-in-chief, {Randle, 862 P.2d at 
1338; Astill, 956 P.2d at 1087). Randle and Astill are inapposite here where Timpanogos 
did not present new facts or evidence not addressed in plaintiffs' case-in-chief, but 
addressed the same issue addressed by plaintiffs' witnesses, Dr. Elliott and Nurse 
Mahlmeister, i.e. whether it was within the standard of care for the nurses not to have 
called Dr. Richards' at 5:50 a.m. Given that his opinion was wholly cumulative of both 
Dr. Elliott's and Nurse Mahlmeister's testimony, it was not error to bar Dr. Nageotte. 
Furthermore, there was an additional reason the court properly denied plaintiffs 
request to call Dr. Nageotte. At trial, plaintiffs also argued that Dr. Nageotte's testimony 
was necessary to rehabilitate their other expert, Dr. Elliott, who criticized Dr. Richards, 
on cross-examination during their case in chief, for leaving the hospital. (R. 3023, at 
2086-88, 2090-92). If plaintiffs felt they needed to rehabilitate Dr. Elliott for being 
critical of Dr. Richards during cross-examination, they had the opportunity to call Dr. 
Nageotte during their case in chief. As the trial court explained: 
The issue in my mind is not whether the nurses should have called Dr. 
Richards, there's plenty of the evidence in the record for the plaintiff on 
that. The issue is whether Dr. Nageotte is going to rehabilitate your witness 
that was, on cross-examination, critical of Dr. Richards. 
MS. LYBBERT: Leaving. 
THE COURT: And that's the issue. Now, the other problem with this at 
this point is if I allow it on rebuttal - and defense makes a good point, you 
closed. If you wanted to call another witness to rehabilitate on cross, you 
had an opportunity. But now if it's offered for rebuttal, how do I avoid 
surrebuttal in having the expert who was critical of Dr. Richards being 
brought in by the defense and now open up a new round of trial and issues 
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regarding the negligence of Dr. Richards on rebuttal and surrebuttal, how 
do I avoid that? 
(R. 3023, at 2090-91). 
Thus, on either ground (cumulative or opportunity to call during case-in-chief) or 
both, the trial court certainly did abuse its discretion, much less commit reversible error, 
in denying plaintiffs' request to call Dr. Nageotte as a rebuttal witness. 
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion, Much Less 
Commit Reversible Error, In Prohibiting Ms. Judith Walker 
From Testifying Because She Was Not Timely Disclosed. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in prohibiting Ms. Walker from testifying 
because (1) they could not anticipate the need for this testimony when they served their 
trial witness list thirty days before trial, and (2) her testimony was not required to be 
disclosed any sooner under U.R.C.P. 26(a)(4) because it was solely for impeachment. 
Both of plaintiffs' arguments are without merit. Moreover, plaintiffs' offer of proof was 
woefully deficient on this point. All that plaintiffs' "proffer" advised was that Ms. 
Walker would testify that Nurse Harvey teaches nurses "differently" than she testified in 
court concerning appropriate nursing care. (R. 3023, at 2077-78, 2081-84). The proffer 
did not advise what the "differences" were, much less that they were on relevant and 
substantive matters, as opposed to tangential, irrelevant, or immaterial points. See Dansak 
v. Deluke, 366 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1961), stating: 
An offer of proof must be certain, sufficient, and intelligible and must 
definitely state the facts sought to be proved. It must show the materiality, 
competency, and relevancy of the evidence offered. The instant proffer is 
certainly deficient under these standards and, therefore, it follows that the 
lower court did not err in excluding the testimony of Mr. Kennon. 
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The proffer of Nurse Walker's testimony is "certainly deficient" under this standard as 
well, and the trial court's ruling can be upheld on this ground alone. 
Furthermore, under Utah law, "when the offering party contends that the 
undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges 
on whether the evidence 'sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated 
prior to trial r Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Utah 1994)(emphasis in original). 
In their brief, plaintiffs argue that they "could not have anticipated the need for this 
testimony when they served their trial witness list thirty days before trial" because "part 
of Ms. Walker's proposed testimony was based on a presentation that Ms. Harvey made 
to nurses just a few weeks before trial and that Ms. Walker just became aware of." (PL 
Br. at 41). But again, that was not plaintiffs' proffer. 
In their proffer, plaintiffs asserted that Ms. Walker's testimony about unspecified 
"differences" would be based on a long history that Ms. Walker had with Nurse Harvey, 
i.e., that Ms. Walker "has studied under Carol Harvey and she has been to many of the 
seminars, many of the programs Carol Harvey has presented." (R. 3023, at 2077-78). 
Based on this proffer the trial court soundly denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to 
call Ms. Walker as a rebuttal witness stating: 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. The motion to call her is denied 
based on the Turner v. Nelson case [where] the Court said the issue hinges 
on whether the evidence sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been 
anticipated prior to trial. From what you've just told me, you clearly had 
the opportunity to take the deposition of Nurse Harvey, you knew about her 
teaching credentials, you knew what she taught, you had ample opportunity 
to investigate that. It's nothing new that's been brought up in her trial 
testimony that wasn't available to you prior to trial. And so, therefore, you 
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could have anticipated this and it should have been disclosed. The motion's 
denied. 
(R. 3023, at 2083-84). 
Again, there was no abuse of discretion, no error and no reversible error. See Roundy v. 
Staley, 984 P.2d 404, 407-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (trial court committed reversible error 
because it did allow defendant to introduce previously undisclosed impeachment 
evidence in rebuttal). 
Finally, with respect to the most recent seminar Nurse Harvey gave three weeks 
prior to trial (PI. Br. 41) that plaintiffs now claim Ms. Walker would have discussed, 
plaintiffs were able to explore that subject by conducting an extensive cross-examination 
of Nurse Harvey as to her teachings at that seminar, eliciting Nurse Harvey's 
acknowledgement that she had not ever testified at trial concerning the subject of the 
seminar (top five errors in electronic fetal monitoring interpretation). (R. 3022, at 1801-
1806). 
3. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Nurse Anderson From 
Testifying Because Was She Not Competent To Testify And 
Her Testimony Would Only Have Been Cumulative Of Nurse 
Mahlmeister. 
The trial court summarized both of the correct bases for its ruling, precluding 
Nurse Anderson's testimony as follows: 
What's really important here is that timeliness does not change the fact that 
Nurse Anderson cannot be permitted to testify as an expert if she's not 
qualified to do so, which she clearly is not. There's been no foundation of 
that in the deposition testimony sufficient to satisfy the rules of evidence. 
42 
In addition, I do agree that her testimony is cumulative and repetitive of 
your expert Nurse Mahlmeister's testimony and, therefore, [her] deposition 
may not be used at trial. 
(R. 3019, at 811). 
In Utah, the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony is set forth in Utah 
Rule of Evidence 702: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
U.R.E. 702 (West 2009). 
When determining the competency of an expert, "the critical factor . . . is whether 
that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it." 
Depew v. Sullivan, 71 P.3d 601, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), The trial court is vested with 
broad discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine if 
the witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular matter. Anton v. Thomas, 806 
P.2d 744, 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "Such a ruling will not be reversed unless the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony, and, even then, only if the 
appellant can show 4the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial 
influence in bringing about a different verdict." Id. citing, Gaw v. State Dept. ofTransp., 
798 P.2d 1130, 1133-34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting plaintiffs to read 
Nurse Anderson's deposition into evidence during rebuttal, much less commit reversible 
error. At her deposition, Nurse Anderson unequivocally demonstrated an utter lack of 
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knowledge of the current standard of care for nurses practicing in labor and delivery. 
Nurse Anderson testified that the last time she practiced labor and delivery was over 25 
years ago (approximately 15 years before Trevin's birth) in 1985 at Ashley Valley 
Medical Center. (R. 2106). Nurse Anderson further testified that the last time she taught 
anyone principles of labor and delivery was over 10 years go in 1995. (R. 2107). Later in 
her deposition, Nurse Anderson conceded that her ability to discuss the applicable 
standards of care was based on what they were when she left her teaching job in 1995. 
(R. 2104). Given that Nurse Anderson was self-admittedly unfamiliar with the applicable 
standard of care (R. 2099), had not practiced in labor and delivery in over 25 years, had 
not taught labor and delivery principles to anyone in almost 15 years, it was proper for 
the trial court to exclude her deposition testimony on this ground alone, (R. 3019, at 806, 
811). Clearly, Nurse Anderson lacked knowledge of standards of care in labor and 
delivery, sufficient to "assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it," Depew, 71 
P.3d at 615, and the trial court correctly so ruled. 
Moreover, as the trial court recognized, even if qualified as an expert, Nurse 
Anderson's testimony criticizing the nurses for not calling Dr. Richards at 5:50 a.m. 
would have been wholly cumulative and repetitive of the testimony of plaintiffs' experts 
Nurse Mahlmeister and Dr. Elliott, and it would not be proper rebuttal. (R. 3019, at 811); 
See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404, and Adams v. 
Lang, 275 P.2d 881 discussed supra. See also Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 
P.2d 445, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (even if a trial court finds that an expert is qualified 
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to testify as an expert witness in a case, the court still must evaluate the expert's 
testimony in light of Utah Rule of Evidence 403). 
Rule 403 provides that "[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighted by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence" U.R.E. 403 (West 2009) (emphasis 
added). During her deposition, Nurse Anderson deferred to Nurse Mahlmeister on 
whether the standard of care required the nurses to have called Dr. Richards at 5:49/5:50 
a.m. due to a deceleration. (R. 2099). Thus, as further testament to her lack of knowledge 
of the standard of care and that her testimony would have been cumulative nonetheless, 
even if allowed to testify, Nurse Anderson's testimony would not have added anything to 
Nurse Mahlmeister's testimony. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the "fact that Ms. Anderson was retained as an expert for 
the Hospital gave her testimony weight that the other experts' testimony did not have" 
and therefore it was error to exclude her testimony. (PL Br. at 45). In support of this 
argument, plaintiffs cite to Board of Education of South Sanpete School District v. 
Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980) for the proposition that "it was error not to let the 
defendant call an expert who had prepared an appraisal at the request of the plaintiff 
without allowing the defendant to elicit the fact that the witness had been employed by 
the plaintiff." (PL Br. at 45). Plaintiffs mischaracterize the facts and holding of Barton. 
In Barton, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to call 
the witness but then prohibiting the defendant from questioning the witness regarding 
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who paid for his appraisal. Barton, 617 P.2d at 349. There was no issue in Barton 
concerning the witness' qualifications or the propriety of rebuttal testimony, thus, Barton 
offers no support for the admission of cumulative evidence in rebuttal or the admission of 
expert opinions by an "expert" who was unqualified to render such opinions - the two 
reasons the trial court properly barred Nurse Anderson's testimony in this case. (R. 3019, 
at 811). 
II. In No Event Did Any Of The Trial Court's Rulings About Which Plaintiffs 
Complain Constitute Reversible Error. 
While none of the evidentiary and other trial court rulings about which plaintiffs 
complain constituted an abuse of discretion or error of any kind, in no event could they 
ever rise to the level of reversible error, requiring that "the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict." Anton v. 
Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), citing, Gaw v. State Dept. ofTransp., 
798 P.2d 1130, 1133-34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
The fundamental issue in this case was whether the nurses should have called Dr. 
Richards at 5:51 a.m., instead of at 6:05 a.m. None of the rulings that the trial court 
made, or any of the evidence the trial court excluded, would have changed the following 
testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses who agreed that the fetal heart tracings in this case did 
not give the Timpanogos nurses any cause for alarm or any basis to believe that Mrs. 
Braithwaite would not give birth to a healthy baby, until the abnormal decelerations at 
6:03 a.m. after which Dr. Richards was immediately called. 
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Nurse Laura Mahlmeister 
Q: Is variability then, just in layman's terms, a good thing? 
A: It's a good thing, because it tells a nurse that the baby is in very 
good shape because it's receiving adequate oxygenation at that point 
in time to meet its metabolic needs and to survive and thrive during 
the birth process. (R. 3018, at 385)(emphasis added). 
Q: And now between 4:55 and 6:00 a.m., this is now after Dr. Richards 
left, again there was another, I think, five or six decelerations that 
you've explained to the jury, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And again each one of those are followed by accelerations and 
variability, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: All right. And for instance there is a deceleration that occurred right 
4:58 just minute after Dr. Richards left, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And we talked about that a little bit at your deposition and you 
indicated that the accelerations and the variability give us a 
reassuring pattern at that time, right? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: Okay. And so we can agree that all the way from the beginning of 
the monitoring, up until 6:05 or 6:06 a.m. there was no indication 
whatsoever that this baby was ever acidotic until that process began 
to change at that final deceleration, right? 
A: Yes. I want to be clear that the jury understands the drop in the heart 
rate actually started at 6:03, but that a reasonable and prudent nurse 
would continue to watch that for a few minutes, one or two minutes, 
to make sure it was different, that it was remaining low, and so by 
6:05, yes. 
Q: Okay? 
A: The nurses would know this is serious and very different. 
Q: Again, to my point in terms of the interpretation of the fetal 
monitoring, we agreed in terms of the assessment of this strip as an 
expert, that from 3:25 a.m. to 6:03 or 6:05, there was no indication 
of any acidosis to this baby, right? 
A: Absolutely correct. (R. 3018, at 461-62) (emphasis added). 
Q: And prior to this dramatic change at 6:05, this is a baby that is 
reactive, not acidotic, has accelerations, all of which are very 
reassuring, right? 
A: Yes, absolutely. (R. 3018, at 463)(emphasis added). 
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Q: And I think in fact you told us at your deposition that up until that 
change at 6:03 or 6:05, there was every reason to expect that this 
baby would deliver vaginally and be healthy? 
A: That is correct. I did say that and I agree. 
Q: And I think you also told us that there's no reason for the nurses to 
advocate something like a cesarean section before this change at 
6:03? 
A: That is correct. (R. 3018, at 465) (emphasis added). 
Dr. Stephen Glass 
Q: All right. And so, tell us your opinion. What—your opinions in the 
case . . . . 
A: Okay. I think No. 1,1 think 6:03 is the onset. Prior to 6:03, Trevin 
by all measures was a normal fetus, he was a normal baby inside. 
We see no indicators at the time during pregnancy or after, that 
Trevin was developing abnormally, growing abnormally, or had any 
other illness or injury that preceded that point in time. (R. 3018, at 
536-37) (emphasis added). 
Q: Was there any indication that there was any abnormality in the 
pregnancy or in the baby, up until the time of 6:03? 
A: None. (R. 3018, at 543) (emphasis added). 
Dr. John Elliott 
Q: And, again, through all these monitor tracings that you've talked 
about tonight all the way up until 6:03 a.m., there was evidence of 
accelerations and/or variability telling us that this baby was not 
acidotic, right? 
A: Correct. (R. 3020, at 1233) (emphasis added). 
Q: And in this case, when there were decelerations, the nurses properly 
provided those interventions and each time again, up to 6:03, the 
baby responded with either variability or accelerations, right? 
A: The baby recovered, yes.(R. 3020, at 1239) (emphasis added). 
Given these unequivocal admissions by plaintiffs' own witnesses, their further 
criticism of the Timpanogos nurses for not calling Dr. Richards at 5:50 a.m., rung hollow 
and were understandably rejected by the jury. None of the trial court's rulings would 
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have changed any of this testimony which totally undermined plaintiffs' entire theory of 
the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs had a fair trial. The jury duly deliberated and concluded that plaintiffs 
had not carried their burden of proof on the issue of professional negligence. There is no 
claim that the jury was improperly instructed or that the evidence did not support their 
unanimous and well-considered verdict, and plaintiffs' appeal points afford no basis to 
set aside the judgment entered on that verdict. Accordingly, Timpanogos Regional 
Medical Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation, d/b/a Timpanogos Regional Hospital and 
Timpanogos Regional Hospital respectfully requests that the judgment below be 
affirmed, 
DATED this 12th day of August, 2009. 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
Eric P. Schoonveld 
Steve D. Alderman 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 403, Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 702. Testimony by experts. 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for 
expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the 
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
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